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Nowadays, the risk analysis of critical systems cannot be focused only on a technical dimension. 
Indeed last well known accidents in nuclear or aerospace areas underlined initiating causes also related 
to technical and organisational viewpoints. It led to the development of methods for risk assessment 
considering three main aspects on the system resources: the technical process, the operator 
constraining the process, and the organisation constraining human actions on the process. However, 
only few scientific works tried to federate these methods in a unique and global approach. Thus this 
paper is focusing on a methodology aiming to achieve the integration of the different methods in order 
to probabilistically assess the risks. The integration is based on (a) system knowledge structuring and 
(b) its unified modelling by means of Bayesian Networks supporting also quantification and 
simulation phases. The methodology is applied to an industrial case to show its feasibility and to 
conclude on the model relevance for system risk analysis. The results of the methodology can be used 
by decision makers to prioritise their actions in face with potential or real risks.   
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Risk and more particularly the Accidental Risk is an inherent notion of all operating industrial 
systems. It is studied from many years and the identification of its causes tends nowadays to a 
diversification. Indeed, until seventies, the risk studies were centred on technical aspects of systems 
[1]. Then several major accidents, such as the Three Miles Island nuclear accident and the Bhopal 
catastrophe, have underlined complementary causes addressing operator errors and organisational 
dysfunctions. These accidents allowed the scientific community to propose, in eighties, first methods 
centred on the analysis of these human errors. It led to enlarge the Human Reliability Analysis area 
with methods such as THERP [2], CREAM [3], ATHEANA [4] … In addition, in nineties, other 
accidents (Challenger explosion, Chernobyl nuclear accident …) have emphasised the importance of 
organisational dysfunctions in accident occurrences. In that way, they contributed to the emergence of 
different theories for the organisational issue study such as the Normal Accident [5] and the High 
Reliability Organisations [6]. One main consequence has been that the risk analysis evolved to cover 
the whole of these causes (technical, human and organisational). It is particularly true for critical 
installations (such as nuclear power plants, chemical processes …) for which regulations become more 
and more drastic according to safety rules. Nevertheless these types of analyses are often difficult to 
achieve due to the volume of the required resources to be developed and the management hesitation. 
Therefore the well deployment of such analyses is mandatory correlated with an adapted methodology. 
This methodology has to propose knowledge structuring, knowledge unification and also 
demonstrative aspects (for decision makers). Recent scientific works hold this issue but generally in a 
partial way (i.e. focused on specific system resources) or for specific industrial sectors. It has been 
demonstrated qualitatively in [7], focused on learning processes in [8], for the French railroad 
company in [9], for chemical systems in [10], for nuclear power plants in [11, 12, 13], and focused on 
the workload prediction in [14]. To face these gaps, it is proposed to develop a methodology based on 
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generic concepts (i.e. not sector-based) with an emphasis on knowledge structuring and unification to 
handle technical, human and organisational aspects in a same and unique model. This methodology 
aims to enable a probabilistic estimation of risky scenarios occurrence by considering safety barriers 
impacts on the system and on its performances. Indeed, safety barriers are defined as key elements in 
the risks prevention field because they are playing a critical position in the system operation [15]. 
Then human and organisational changes can be studied by means of these safety elements in order to 
identify and anticipate critical situations. The proposition of a probabilistic approach is done by using 
Bayesian Networks [16]. This modelling tool allows the merging of different kinds of probabilistic 
knowledge with no Boolean variables and uncertainties propagation in a same model. 
This innovative methodology results from collaboration between a research centre (CRAN), a French 
end-user operating conventional and nuclear power plants (EDF) and the French National Institute for 
Industrial Environment and Risks (INERIS). 
The methodology proposed in the paper is addressing as follows: the section 1 defines methodology 
phases, principles and characteristics. Subsequently, methods for knowledge collection and extraction 
are developed for each system dimension. Then the section 2 proposes techniques for system 
knowledge identification and extraction, leading in section 3 to unify this knowledge by means of 
Bayesian Networks. The methodology feasibility is illustrated in section 4 with an application on a 
risky scenario resulting from the operation of a chemical process. Finally some conclusions and 
perspectives are developed. 
 
1. Methodological approach 
Based on systemic principles [17], the proposed methodology is organised with the following phases 
[18]: 
- Definition of system limits. It consists in specifying the system characteristics and the contextual 
ones to be studied in this analysis.  
- Knowledge extraction. It leads to an identification of adequate methods to be used to collect 
information in each dimension identified in the previous stage.  
- Knowledge unification. It aims to define a shared representation of these different kinds of 
information that enables thereafter their aggregation in a risk model.  
- Risk model construction. It consists in building a model based on the right modelling technique and 
allowing the studies of risky scenarios. In the proposed approach, different kinds of knowledge 
should be merged in a same risk model by means of Bayesian Networks. 
Considering the key role of safety barriers to prevent risky scenarios occurrence [19], it is also 
required to model the operation of these system safety components: 
- Definition of barrier models. It enables to depict a convenient modelling of these safety elements, 
based on generic and partial models.  
- Estimation of barriers effectiveness and their impacts on the system. It consists in using the model 
to simulate scenarios in order to classify risks, to prioritise strategies and investments.  
 
1.1. System dimensions 
In the way to well identity the limits of the studied system, it is proposed to define a conceptual 
framework (Figure 1). This framework enables the characterisation of studied system dimensions and 
their interactions. It is based on principles developed in [20] which specify that “an important feature 
of this model is that management factors affect the physical system only through human decisions and 
actions”. 
In the proposed framework (Figure 1, [21]), the system is broken down into three representative layers 
and influenced by two contextual layers [22, 23, 24]: the technical layer, the actions layer, the 
organisational layer, the organisational context (context in which the system is evolving in relation to 
factors such as social, regulations, competition), and the natural environment context (such as the 
evolution of the physical and natural climate depending on weather data, geographical implantation 
…). 
These layers interact through three kinds of exchanges defined as follows: 
- Horizontal exchange - in a same abstraction layer, 
- Vertical exchange - between two contiguous abstraction layers, 
- Transactional exchange - between a system abstraction layer and a contextual one (Figure 1).  
 
The transactional exchange is defined because system variables have different characteristics than 
contextual variables. Indeed, the first ones can be controlled while the second variables influence the 
system but are undergone.  
 
2. Knowledge collection and extraction 
On the basis of the system dimension definition, it is needed to select adequate methods to represent 
them in a risk analysis objective. Thus, in the scope of risks estimation (step E), an identification of 
similarities between technical risk analyses (defined in [53]) and human/organisational ones (Figure 2) 
underlines that it is required to define goals to be reached (steps A and B). Then field theories need to 
be identified to use the adequate methods to collect information (step C) and to propose a shared 
representation of the studied system (step D). These items are addressed in this section to characterise 
each system dimension, through a bottom-up approach as depicted in Figure 1. 
 
2.1. The technical dimension 
 
2.1.1. The bow-tie representation 
Many methods can be used to study technical failures (FMEA, HAZOP, fault trees, event trees, 
reliability diagrams …). The choice of one between them depends mainly of the study aims [1]. Thus, 
in this approach, it is proposed to use the bow-tie method (Figure 3 and Table 1, developed in the 
European project ARAMIS [25]). Indeed, the bow-tie method enables the description of an accident 
scenario occurrence by each path from initiators to final consequences. It is done by graphically 
aggregating a deductive method through a fault tree and an inductive one through an event tree [12]. 
Moreover for assessing the risk level of events (CE, ME ... in Table 1), this aggregation is achieved in 
a probabilistic computation. Concerning safety barriers, they are represented by means of vertical bars 
(Figure 3) in order to materialise an opposition to the accident scenario development. The barrier 
depiction proposed in this method has to be specified for the global issue considering the study of their 
operation and impacts on the system.  
 
UE Undesirable Event Drift or failure apart from usual conditions of operation, supposed to occur exceptionally 
CUE Current Event Accepted event that can occur more or less frequently in normal conditions of exploitation 
IE Initiating Event Direct cause of a loss of containment (LOC, for fluids) or a loss of physical integrity (LPI, for solids) 
CE Critical Event Represented by a LOC or a LPI 
SCE Secondary Critical Event Direct consequence of the critical event and at the origin of the accident/incident occurrence 
DP Dangerous Phenomenon Physical event that can lead to major damages 
ME Major Event Effect on targets (human beings, structures, environment) issued from the dangerous phenomena 
Table 1: Definition of bow-tie variables 
 
2.1.2. The barrier notion 
A safety barrier is an entity implemented within the system to avoid the occurrence of a risky scenario 
by preventing/limiting the critical event occurrence (prevention barrier) or by reducing consequences 
of this event (protection one) [22]. These entities are composed either of a Safety Instrumented System 
(SIS) or of a Safety Device (SD, active or passive). A SIS is a barrier needing external activation. This 
barrier type is composed of three sub-systems [19] (as defined in [54]): Detection (sensors), 
Processing (logic solvers), and Action (final elements). These sub-systems can be composed of 







Detection It consists of equipment, which converts a measure (temperature, pressure, flow) in another one, often electric (voltage, current, resistance), that can be directly used for the measurement or the control. 
Processing It can consist of acquiring a measure by a sensor and displaying it, or activating a control of one or more actuators from a combinative function of sensors information. 
Action It consists of equipment, which converts a signal (electric or pneumatic) into a physical phenomenon, allowing it to control a pump moving off, a valve closing or its opening. 
Action of 
operators 
Detection It consists of getting one or more pieces of information allowing a failure identification (or detection), relieved by a technical device. The operator can be more or less active in this detection. 
Processing It consists of making a diagnosis from detection stage information and selecting the adequate security action. 
Action It consists of a manual action relieved by a technical device, countering the critical scenario. 
Table 2: Definition of SIS sub-systems 
 
An active SD is a barrier needing a mechanical system to develop an action (safety pressure, valve) 
but without external source of energy. In addition, a passive SD is a permanent barrier without human 
action, energy source, or information source. In this approach, SD barriers are considered as a 
particularisation of SIS ones because they are usually composed of one technical sub-system. 
Considering the fact that these barriers (SIS and SD ones) are composed of, at least, a technical device, 
they can then prevent a scenario occurrence if they are available [12]. The availability is defined in 
[55] as the “ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under given conditions at 
a given instant of time or during a given time interval, assuming that the required external resources 
are provided”. It is function of intrinsic data (which is purely technical and represented by 
manufacturer’s data) and contextual data (which represent human and organisational influences on this 
intrinsic data). 
 
2.2. The human dimension 
 
2.2.1. Action classes 
During the study of the system functioning, it has been observed that the availability of any technical 
component is acted upon human actions. These actions are gathered into two categories: 
- the maintenance actions (defined as the “combination of all technical, administrative and 
managerial actions during the life cycle of an item intended to retain it in, or restore it to, a state in 
which it can perform the required function” [55]), 
- the control actions (allowing the system to properly operate). 
In this methodology, indirect influences are characterised by maintenance actions and direct ones by 
control actions [21, 26]. This configuration is justified because the system availability, ensured by the 
effectiveness of maintenance actions, depends on its production capacity (or operability), ensured by 
the effectiveness of control actions. These actions effectiveness have to be quantitatively assessed 
according to principles developed in the Human Factors field.  
 
The human factors can be studied through two fields which have different characteristics and aims: 
Ergonomics and Human Reliability2. However in relation to the aim of estimating the effectiveness of 
specific human actions, the objective is not to characterise the human-system interaction and its 
influence on the action effectiveness but mainly to qualify the impact of the organisation on the action 
effectiveness. This system configuration implies to identify human reliability concepts. 
Human reliability can be defined as the ability of a human operator to perform a required mission 
under given conditions during a given time interval. It concerns the analysis and impact of humans on 
the reliability and safety of systems [27], by considering human actions not only as a source of error 
[28] but also as a source of performance [29]. It leads to enlarge the classical human task analyses area 
[30] in which the details of individual behaviours mechanisms are not considered. This expansion is 
done by focusing on collective behaviours through an aggregation of the different individual 
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behaviours acting together for the mission effectiveness. Thus, the proposed developments 
(representative variables, quantification method …) are more based on principles developed in the 
Human Reliability field with a collective and quantitative point of view.  
 
2.2.2. Representative variables 
In the industrial context of this work, a comparison of methods used by the French Electricity Board 
nuclear branch (EDF) and the French National Institute for Industrial Environment and Risks 
(INERIS) has led to select the variables defined hereafter. Some of these indicators are related to the 
collective characteristics:  
- (De) Delegation, defined as transferring a task responsibility to another person, generally a 
subordinate. It can be introduced by the management (formal delegation) or not (informal one). 
- (Ex) Experience, defined as knowledge acquired by practice, completed by thought on this practice. 
- (Tr) Training, defined as the whole of the activities aiming at ensuring the acquisition of skills, 
knowledge and required behaviours to hold down a job. 
- (Cmgd) Collective management and group dynamic, which is composed of rules (formal and 
informal) and work skills used by the collective to reach goals. It can be defined as the ability of a 
collective to fit a specific situation and to balance a potential drift. 
In addition, other variables are specific with the tools and procedures that are used by the collective to 
achieve its actions:  
- (Ai) Aids, which represent the whole of the procedures (prescriptive and non-prescriptive 
documents) and tools (other documents and equipments) used by operators in support with their 
activity. 
-  (Rws) Respect of work specifications. Work specifications hold information concerning the system, 
objectives to be reached and means making it possible to reach these goals. Their fulfilments are 
possible if this information has been correctly defined and if these objectives are achievable. 
- (Rtc) Real-time control, defined by controls (conformity evaluations by observations and judgments 
completed if necessary by measurements, tests or calibrations) and goals achievement (means used 
to appraise the visibility of action issues without considering means used to reach these issues). 
- (Fe) Feedback experience, which consists in capitalising and exploiting information resulting from 
the analysis of positive and/or negative events. 
And the last variable is about external factors that can influence the collective during actions 
achievement: 
- (Cf) Contextual factors, characterised by external elements influencing the studied action (lights, 
smog, other human actions in progress ...). 
 
Considering differences between technical process operation and collective behaviours, it is proposed 
to study human influences on the technical process as external disturbances, in the sense that the 
technical system moves from a stable state (valid before the human intervention) to another stable state 
(valid after this human intervention). Between these stable states, the technical process evolves in a 
changing state [21, 26]. 
 
2.2.3. Local features of studied systems   
In relation to the technical process, this changing state principle is characterised by the fact that the 
subject (the collective) consider its action with the change of the object state (the safety component) 
and takes temporally control of it [31]. This control is materialised by a physical contact (through 
instruments, tools) between subject and object. As a consequence, this contact brings to the subject the 
energy required for the object transformation. It leads to define, in the proposed approach, that each 
action is related to a specific component. Therefore it means to clearly identify the technical 
component which is influenced by human actions. For example, an action cannot impact directly a 
physical phenomenon such as a tank explosion. This relationship has to be first represented with the 
tank availability (as defined in section 2.1.2) and then, by adding human influences. 
Concerning the human action, this change can be seen as a local organisational change, inspired by 
[32] and divided into three generic steps (Figure 4): the Preparation, the Execution, and the Closing. 
This representation allows a knowledge structuring and can be helpful during and after interviews to 
control the information collection and to organise this information (Table 3). 
 
Action step Definition Associated action indicators 




Execution It allows the implementation of this intervention in the system operation. 
Experience 
Respect of work specifications 
Contextual factors 
Collective management and group dynamic 
Closing It is a strengthening which ensures the proper integration of this intervention and confirms its continuity. 
Real time control 
Feedback experience 
Table 3: Definition of action steps and associated action indicators 
 
Some comments can be developed on the indicators defined in this section: 
- They are specific of an action, and must be defined for each action through activity analyses. 
- The whole of these characteristics aims at being exhaustive but can be adapted. Indeed, variables 
can be added or deleted for specific contexts. 
- Their achievements are constrained by the organisational climate in which operators are evolving. It 
is thus required to define how to study and represent this dimension regarding needs of the 
proposed approach. 
 
2.3. The organisational dimension 
 
2.3.1. The concept of Organisational Factor  
Two theories are at the root of the development of organisational factors for hazardous systems. They 
are named the “Normal Accident Theory” (NAT) and the “High Reliability Organisations” (HRO). 
The first one is based on the “idea that in some technological systems, accidents are inevitable or 
normal” due to the combination of “interactive complexity and tight coupling” which “determine a 
system susceptibility” to unforeseen or prevented accidents. The second one is defined “as the subset 
of hazardous organisations that enjoy a record of high safety over long period of time” [33]. These 
fields define basically different views concerning socio-technical systems evolution leading to 
different representations for organisational factors. 
Nowadays, there exist different scientific contributions that propose to define these factors [34]. From 
a first survey based on [35, 36, 37, 38, 39], over thirty different factors can be identified. Nevertheless 
these factors are related “to the safe, normal, routine operation of an organisation that manages risk. At 
no time is the question of accidents and their teachings mentioned, although they are clearly 
characteristic of the safety of which the aim is to avoid accident”. Thus, it is proposed to use (in the 
methodology) the medical metaphor [34, 37] defines as follow: “for determining if an organisation is 
in good health, it is far simpler to know the causes of the sicknesses … It is more accessible to define a 
set of pathogenic organisational factors than to exhaustively list the organisational factors required and 
sufficient to ensure a good safety level within an organisation”. 
 
2.3.2. The chosen representation 
In that way, a pathogenic organisational factor (POF) results of the aggregation of convergent signs 
that allow the characterisation of a negative influence on the system safety. Seven organisational 
factors, issued from industrial case and accident report analyses, have been defined in a generic way 
[34]. 
Among the seven factors, four of them are defined as follows:  
- (FDSM) Failure in Daily Safety Management. The daily safety management deals with the safety 
requirements implementation within the organisation. Its main goals are to ensure a good agreement 
between workers activities and competencies in order to give relevant training courses to teams and 
to ensure that the safety knowledge is always transferred to adequate operators. This daily safety 
management could be judged as inadequate when financial means and resources are not enough to 
implement the daily activities. It failed when, in spite of dedicated means and resources, the 
objectives are not reached due to a failing assessment of the needs and activities. 
- (WCB) Weakness of Control Bodies. Control bodies are those in charge of checking compliance 
with safety obligations by the operator of the high-risk socio-technical system. There are different 
types of control body knowing that they may be associated with the installation, at a corporate level 
of the company, or outside the company. The shortcomings of the control bodies refer to the 
inadequacy of their actions. It means that they do not play the role of counterweight or counter-
power that they are supposed to play. 
- (PHOC) Poor Handling of Organisational Complexity. The organisational complexity deals with 
items that complicate work, decision-making processes and communication relationships related to 
risks and safety issues. This organisational complexity is generally related to several origins. It 
could be linked to the technological complexity, to the building of organisational partitioning, or to 
the multiplication of stakeholders that complicates the coordination inside the organisation. A 
complex and inadequate organisation can also be seen at least by two phenomena: a failing 
organisational communication and a failing coordination. A failing organisational communication 
deals with situations where the transmission of major elements for each worker (e.g. new directive 
or a new way of organising) is not done or is not done totally. In this case, the efficient way of 
communication in the organisation becomes an informal one. A failing coordination deals with 
usual dysfunctions in organisations that are bureaucracy, organisational partitioning and isolation. 
- (NRDH) No Re-examining of the Design Hypotheses. A system design is built on the definition and 
the integration of social and technical dimensioning hypotheses. These hypotheses are based on a 
description of the future system operation. Nevertheless some hypotheses could become out of date 
that is inadequate to a new way of functioning. These hypotheses could also become false because 
the actual operating is proved different from the design one. 
The three last factors are: Shortcomings in the Organisation Culture of Safety (SOCS), Difficulty in 
Implementing Feedback Experience (DIFE), and Production Pressures (PP). 
Each of these factors is characterised by markers, signs and symptoms that allow their identification 
during on-site investigations. Thus, they will be defined once for the whole studied system by means 
of an organisational analysis. This list of factors aims at being exhaustive but could be completed after 
further developments. Indeed, the definition of new (pathogenic or resilient3) factors needs to study 
different incident and/or accident report analyses.  
 
3. Knowledge unification and integration 
 
3.1. Safety studies with Bayesian Networks 
The modelling technique selected for unifying the knowledge coming from the three previous 
dimensions (technical, human and organisational) is the Bayesian Networks (BN). BN are directed 
acyclic graphs in which each node represents a variable, and each arc encodes conditional 
dependencies between these variables [41]. This formalism, initially developed to represent uncertain 
knowledge in artificial intelligence, has nowadays various application fields4 (e.g. marketing, industry, 
health, decision making, risk management ...). More precisely, and in relation to the area in phase with 
the proposed methodology (safety of complex systems, risk assessment …), different research works 
highlight that BN are particularly well-suited [42]. The first item is about considering BN as a 
generalisation of the tree formalism to deal with the complexity of studied systems. In [43], the 
authors use the notion of polytrees, and in [44] the authors develop a method that allows the 
translation of fault trees into BN (by using multi-state variables). The second item underlines works 
that use Dynamic Bayesian Networks (DBN) to evaluate the reliability of complex systems. In [45] 
and [46], it is demonstrated how DBN can represent Markov chains to model system availability and 
reliability. In [47], an evaluation of the reliability of technical systems based on the DBN formalism is 
proposed, and in [48], the authors use Dynamic Object Oriented Bayesian Networks (DOOBN) to 
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evaluate reliability of complex systems. The last item is about a synthesis of different stages that 
enable the modelling of complex systems through BN in a reliability objective [42].  
 
In addition, different approaches based on BN formalism are addressing the risk analysis of such 
complex systems. First, the considerations of exogenous variables allow the modelling to be closer to 
operating conditions of studied systems [49]. Second, [50, 11, 14] are focusing on the integration of 
human factors in the risk analysis process. Finally, [12, 51] propose an integration of organisational 
factors in the risk analysis process.  
 
Thus, the choice of BN tool for the modelling aspect of the methodology is justified with the previous 
explanations but also in relation to the characteristics of the systems studied in this paper.  
It means now to focus on the specifications of this technique knowing that [14], “since Bayesian 
Networks precision is directly related to the prior knowledge embedded in them … it was imperative 
to provide a technique to accurately model the prior knowledge and the way is represented in the 
conditional probability tables (CPT)”.  
 
3.2. Risk model development: human and organisational dimensions 
 
3.2.1. Model objectives 
In relation to the human and organisational dimensions, the main modelling objective consists in 
estimating the human action effectiveness considering its organisational context in order to enable an 
assessment of safety barriers availability [26]. The proposed model should allow the study of different 
kinds of impacts according to available information (themselves depending on the main subject of on-
site investigations) such as impacts of the organisation on the collective, impacts of the collective on 
action effectiveness and impacts of the organisation on this effectiveness. This model is also 
developed, in case of critical situation diagnoses, to identify the most influent variables (i.e. the 
knowledge of some variables state allows to isolate the most influent causes in the studied situation). 
Then, information concerning an action can be obtained: 
-  by means of an analysis of the feedback experience and experts judgments for a yet-implemented 
action, 
- by (direct or indirect) impacts of the organisation and/or other yet-implemented actions (through 
their specific indicators) for a new action (not yet-implemented in the system operation, and with no 
feedback experience). 
 
3.2.2. Impacts identification method 
Possible influences between POF and human action variables have been identified on the basis of their 
local characteristics (signs and symptoms for POF, indicators and actions stages for human action 
variables). The approach (cf. Figure 5) is defined in several steps as follow: identification of influences 
between indicators and signs/symptoms in one hand and between action stages and signs/symptoms in 
other hand (links 1 and 1’), justification of the presence (or absence) of influences between indicators 
and POF in one hand and between action stages and POF in other hand (links 2, 2’, 3 and 3’). If the 
presence of influences can be justified, then links 4 and 4’ are considered in the generic model. 
 
The method implementation which consists in combining knowledge and experience of organisational 
and technical experts to identify and justify all the possible influences, leads to a generic configuration 
depicted in Table 4. Indeed, experts involved in these analyses are considered as referent in their field 
domains due to their theoretical and industrial backgrounds. This configuration is considered as 
generic because it has been defined in a general way (not dedicated to a specific range of applications) 
with the help of organisational experts addressing all the possible configurations. Some examples of 
the justification of the absence/presence of these influences in the generic model are given hereafter: 
- Absence of influence (a blank cell in Table 4) between “NRDH” and “Ex”. Experience is gained by 
observing the real system operation. Design hypotheses, defined during the system design or re-
design, are not considered in this learning process. 
- Presence of influence (a cross in Table 4) between “PP” and “Execution”. If time, budgets, means 
and resources are revised downwards with constant objectives, the execution stage might be 
hurriedly performed, by ignoring some critical steps. It can lead to risky situations. 
 
 Pathogenic Organisational Factors 
Indicators SOCS FDSM WCB PHOC DIFE PP NRDH 
De    X  X  
Ai X  X  X X X 
Tr  X X X X X  
Ex  X    X  
Rws X X X X  X  
Cf    X X X X 
Cmgd X X  X X X  
Rtc   X  X X X 
Fe X X  X X X  
        
Action stages        
Preparation X X X X X X X 
 Execution X X  X X X  
Closing  X X X X X X 
Table 4: Generic influences between POF and (a) Action indicators, (b) Action stages 
 
This influences identification allows the following observations: 
-  all the POF do not impact all the action indicators and stages, 
-  all of these factors have at least an influence on one of the action indicators (or one of the action 
stages), i.e. all of these factors are represented in the model, 
-  a limit of this method lies in meanings given to indicators, actions stages and POF. Indeed, different 
meanings could lead to different configurations. This generic configuration is simplified for specific 
applications by removing influences. 
 
3.2.3. Quantification method 
At this stage, the Bayesian risk model (presented in Figure 5b) has to be up-graded with (a) 
information concerning variables modalities, (b) associated quantification method and (c) conditional 
probability tables (CPT) structuring. In that way, two modalities have been defined for each group of 
(Boolean) variables. 
- For POF: “Absent” (A) and “Present” (P). It means that the pathogenic feature of the considered 
organisational factors (A) has not been proved; (P) has been proved. 
- For human action indicators: “Present” (P) and “Damaged” (D). It means that the considered 
indicator (P) meets action requirements; (D) does not meet (or in a partially way) these 
requirements. 
- For human action effectiveness and its stages: “Effective” (E) and “Ineffective” (I). It means that 
the considered variable (the human action or its stage) (E) fulfils the function for which it has been 
implemented in the system operation, (I) does not fulfil (or in a partially way) this function. 
 
Then the associated quantification method is integrated in the model. It leads first to consider an initial 
configuration, for which the context is completely favourable. The probability of a variable Y to be in 
non-degraded state (“Effective” for action stages), knowing the non-degraded state of all of its parents, 
is settled at ∈0a [0,1]. If one of its parents ( 1X ) is in degraded state (“Damaged” for human action 
indicators), then the probability of the variable Y to be in non-degraded state moves from 0a  to ( )Ya −× 10 α , with ∈−Y1α [0,1] an aggravation factor representative of the worsening influence of the 
parent 1X  on the variable Y. If a second parent ( 2X ) is also in degraded state then the probability of 
the variable Y to be in non-degraded state moves from ( )Ya −× 10 α  to ( )( )YYfa −−× 210 ,αα , with 
∈−Y2α [0,1] an aggravation factor representative of the worsening influence of the parent 2X  on the 
variable Y, and ( )YYf −− 21 ,αα  a function allowing the accumulation of worsening influences of parents 
1X  and 2X  on the variable Y. It is proposed to consider ( ) YYYYf −−−− ×= 2121 , αααα , which can be 
generalised by using the Noisy-Or gate principles because these variables are Boolean [12, 52]. 
Thus, let Y a node and iXX ∪= , the set of parents of Y (with ni ,...3,2,1= ). Instead of defining the 
initial probability of the non-degraded modality of Y as (1) (as it is done in the binary Noisy-Or gate), 
it is proposed to introduce an uncertainty (due to considered variables, which are related to human 
actions and/or the organisational context) and then to define this probability by (2). 
1),...,,,( 321 =nxxxxyP      Binary Noisy-Or (1) 
0321 ),...,,,( axxxxyP n =     with ∈0a [0,1] Leaky Noisy-Or (2) 
where, y : the non-degraded modality of Y, and y : its degraded modality; ix : the non-degraded 
modality of the parent iX , and ix : the degraded modality of this parent. 
Moreover the probability of the non-degraded modality of Y, given that the thi  parent is degraded, is 
defined in (3). 
Yinii axxxxxyPp −×== α0321 ),...,,...,,,(       (3) 
where ∈−Yiα [0, 1] is the influence of the degraded state of the parent iX on the non-degraded state of 
Y. 
Finally, the probability of the non-degraded modality of Y, given XX k ⊆  the subset of parents of Y 
that are in their degraded state, is specified in (4) with an innovative semantic (from the formula 


















0)( α       (4) 
The “× ” operator is used in this approach to support the consideration of the accumulative effect of 
different parents on a variable (i.e. if one parent is in its degraded state, it leads to a less critical 
situation than if two parents are in this state). Thus, the method enables a particularisation of each 
influence identified between two variables. It means that the non-degraded modality column of the 
CPT relative to a variable Y (which can be an action indicator, stage or effectiveness) can be built by 
means of the following principle: for each n parents of the variable Y, all the previous combinatory is 
multiplied by the corresponding aggravation factor (in order to represent all degradations rules related 
to the parent). 
 
3.3. Risk model development: technical and human dimensions 
 
3.3.1. Model objectives 
In relation to the technical and human dimensions, the main modelling objective consists in estimating 
the availability of safety technical components considering human and organisational contexts, and an 
evaluation of their impacts on the system (event occurrences, safety impacts, environment impacts, 
facilities impacts …). In that way, the proposed model allows to represent impacts of human actions 
(maintenance and control actions) on the component availability. As defined previously, this model 
also enables, in case of critical situation diagnoses, an identification of most influent variables (i.e. the 
knowledge of some variables state would allow to identify the most influent parents in the studied 
situation). Then, information concerning a safety technical component can be obtained by means of 
manufacturer’s data, analyses of the feedback experience and experts’ judgments. 
 
3.3.2. Generic models 
As proposed in section 2.1.2, a barrier can be broken down into its technical components. It leads to 
decompose its availability into “Detection availability”, “Processing availability” and “Action 
availability” for SIS barriers type, or into “Technical Component availability” for SD barriers type 
(Figure 6). 
 
These variables (Figure 6) are modelled with object oriented BN as described in [48] (holding an 
encapsulated BN). The generic models and associated quantification methods are developed in [21] 
and have been particularised for different applications as illustrated in section 4 (Figure 11 and Figure 
13). The variable meanings are defined in the following table: 
 
POF Pathogenic Organisational Factors Object depicting organisational factors presented in section 2.3.2 
DA Detection Availability Object depicting the availability of the detection component of the considered SIS 
PA Processing Availability Object depicting the availability of the processing component of the considered SIS 
AA Action Availability Object depicting the availability of the action component of the considered SIS 
TC Technical Component availability Object depicting the availability of the safety device component 
Oab Operational availability of barrier Variable depicting the aggregation of different component availabilities (Detection, Processing and Action, or Technical Component) 
Btv Bow-tie variable Variable modelling event, occurring in the scenario, prevented by a proper barrier operation 
Table 5: Definition of global barrier objects and variables 
 
4. Industrial application 
 
4.1. Industrial context of the studied installation 
The studied system is a part of a chemical process which belongs to a classified installation. It 
produces plastic goods and it employs less than 100 people for a production capacity of 200 million 
pounds per year. This industrial site is ISO 9001 [56], ISO 14001 [57] and OHSAS 18001 [58] 
certified. On-site investigations have emphasised: 
- Competitions between production shifts in one hand, and with other companies in other hand. 
- The subcontracting, due to a workforce cutting (and especially for executives) and an increasing of 
the workload which could lead to “know-how” losses. 
These observations result from reorganisation strategic decisions made in the firm. For these reasons, 
organisational experts have identified three main POF potentially impacting the functioning: “SOCS” 
(Shortcomings in the Organisational Culture of Safety), “PP” (Production Pressures) and “NRDH” 
(No Re-examining of the Design Hypotheses). These factors may contribute to the weakening of the 
system which could eventually lead to a higher probability of risky situations in the future. 
 
The studied installation consists in the end product storage in silos (Figure 7), in which main 
components are: a nitrogen sensor, two level sensors, two temperature sensors, a water system, a filter, 
a hydraulic protection, and shielding braids. 
 
4.2. Studied scenario 
The modelling of this scenario requires information related to the dreaded physical phenomenon and 
the human and organisational specific configuration. 
 
4.2.1. Technical dimension 
In this installation, the main critical event is the silo explosion. Indeed, the remaining solvent that was 
used in the process can evaporate, leading to a flammable cloud. Besides, suspended combustive dusts 
(in this case: plastic dusts) may be disseminated. Hence, an explosion can occur since six conditions 
are simultaneously present (Figure 8). Three of them concern the product and the three last ones are 
related to the environment. When one of these conditions is missed (expect for ones of the fire 
triangle), the explosion does not occur but the resulting ignition and fire will not be prevented. 
 
 
4.2.2. Human and organisational dimensions 
The information on this specific system has been gathered during on-site investigations. The 
investigations consist in developing interviews of executives and operators, achieved by technical and 
organisational experts. The information is used to depict the specific human and organisational 
configuration (Table 6 and Table 7) which is obtained by particularising the generic configuration 
depicted in Table 4 (in section 3.2.2). Thus, in Table 6 and Table 7, the simplified configuration is 
described from keeping only the influences that are assigned a qualification (LI, I, II, TI). It means that 
22 relations from the 37 initial ones are selected in Table 6, and 15 relations in Table 7. The following 
qualitative scale is used to assess each influence:  
- LI (Little impact). The effectiveness is slightly impacted by this pathogenic feature.  
- I (Impact). The effectiveness is significantly impacted by this pathogenic feature.  
- II (Important impact). It materials a tightly impact of this pathogenic feature on the effectiveness. 
- TI (Total impact). It represents a total impact of this pathogenic feature on this effectiveness. 
 
  Pathogenic organisational factors 
Indicators SOCS FDSM WCB PHOC DIFE PP NRDH 
De        
Ai LI  I  LI LI I 
Tr  LI   LI LI  
Ex        
Rws LI     I  
Cf     LI  II 
Cmgd LI LI   LI LI  
Rtc     I LI  
Fe II I   II LI  
Table 6: Human and organisational configuration for the sensor calibration 
 
 Pathogenic organisational factors 
Indicators SOCS FDSM WCB PHOC DIFE PP NRDH 
De        
Ai        
Tr  LI   I LI  
Ex      I  
Rws  II    I  
Cf     LI II LI 
Cmgd        
Rtc     LI I I 
Fe  I   II I  
Table 7: Human and organisational configuration for the braid supervision 
 
As it is defined in Table 3, the relationships between action indicators, its stages and its effectiveness 
are depicted in Table 8 and Table 9.  
 
 Indicators Action 
effectiveness Action stages De Ai Tr Ex Rws Cf Cmgd Rtc Fe 
Preparation I II I       II 
Execution    II I II TI   TI 
Closing        I II I 
Table 8: Quantification of sensor calibration influences 
 
 Indicators Action 
effectiveness Action stages De Ai Tr Ex Rws Cf Cmgd Rtc Fe 
Preparation LI LI LI       LI 
Execution    I I II LI   II 
Closing        II II I 
Table 9: Quantification of braid supervision influences 
 
 
4.3. Scenario modelling 
The scenario modelling is made up of three steps. The first one consists in the bow-tie construction, 
the second one is about its formalisation with Bayesian Networks, and the last one concerns the 
Bayesian model quantification. 
 
4.3.1. Bow-tie representation 
Risk analyses sessions have led by means of the ARAMIS method [25] to the bow-tie diagram shown 
in Figure 9 and Figure 10. Safety barriers identified in this diagram are the following ones: (a) respect 
of procedures or maintenance operating modes, (b) continuous measurement of nitrogen concentration, 
(c) respect of ATEX equipment, (d) grounding (shielding braids), (e) elaboration and respect of fire 
permit, (f) filter. 
 
4.3.2. Bayesian Risk Model 
The resulting Bayesian Network modelled by means of the BayesiaLab software (www.bayesia.com), 
is depicted in Figure 13. Within the model, the barriers ‘a’, ‘c’ and ‘e’ (Figure 9 and Figure 10) are not 
directly represented. They are implicitly present in the characteristics (action indicators in Figure 11) 
of barriers ‘b’ (SIS type), ‘d’ (SD type) and ‘f’. Concerning the last barrier (‘f’), its human and 
organisational contexts are not studied in this application. Indeed, on-site investigations have 
underlined the criticality of the barriers ‘b’ and ‘d’ but not of the barrier ‘f’ (no information was 
obtained concerning this barrier except for its presence in the system). 
 
The objects depicted in Figure 11 (according to generic concepts developed in [21]) model the 
following system features:  
- “POF”, for Pathogenic Organisational Factors,  
- “BC”, for the Barrier Component models, which contain the technical component availability and 
influences of human actions on this availability,  
- “AC”, for Actions Characteristics, which contain indicators, stages and action effectiveness. 
 
4.3.3. Quantification 
The qualitative construction of the risk model has to be assessed in order to make simulations and 
diagnoses. 
 
(1) Human and organisational dimensions 
The quantification of this model part is structured in two stages: 
- Quantification of the initial situation (initial distributions of variables, i.e. in a favourable context): 
It concerns action effectiveness, action stages, action indicators and POF. Their initial distributions 
have been settled at 99% for their non-degraded state (“Effective” modality for action 
effectiveness/stages, “Present” one for action indicators and “Absent” one for POF). 
- Quantification of the CPT: This item is addressed with an estimation of aggravation factors which 
are specific of the situation and obtained by experts’ judgments and/or feedback experience 
analyses. 
 
The qualitative scale assessing each influence in Table 6, Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9 is used to 
compute Yi−α . For this application, the following specific scale is used: ‘LI’ (Little Impact, 95%), ‘I’ 
(Impact, 75%), ‘II’ (Important Impact, 50%), ‘TI’ (Total Impact, 1%). 
 
(2) Technical dimension 
The quantification of this model part is carried out by four stages: 
- Quantification of initiators (by using experts’ judgments and feedback experience analyses). 
 
Initiator Value (%)  Initiator Value (%) 
Air presence 99  Hot spots (extern) 99.9 
Assembly/re-assembly errors 90  
Hot spots 
(intern) 
Level sensor (Low) 
99 
Breaks of piping or tank 99.99  Level sensor (High) 
Cloud of explosive dust 99  Nitrogen sensor 
Electrostatic 
discharge 
Lightning 99.97  Temperature sensor (High) 
Static electricity 1  Temperature sensor (Very high) 
Vagabond currents 0  Hot spots works 99.9 
Explosive atmosphere 0.1  Release of liquid (hydraulic protection) 99 
Failure of the nitrogen production 99  Wear of joints 99 
Table 10: Quantification of the “event absence” modality of initiators 
 







Maintenance action (%) 
Type 1α  2α  
Nitrogen sensor 98 Calibration II 50 I 75 
Shielding braid 99.9 Supervision LI 95 II 50 




Operational availability (%) 
Available Unavailable  Absent 
Processing 99 1 0 
Action (5%) 99.9 0.1 0 
Action (7%) 99 1 0 
Filter 50 50 0 
Table 12: Quantification of barrier component availabilities (2) 
 
- Quantification of intermediate variables CPT. These CPTs are generally defined through logical 
functions (such as AND, OR functions as defined in Figure 9 and Figure 10). 
- Quantification of event tree variables CPT (from experts’ judgments) such as: 
• Silo destruction: If the event “silo explosion” has occurred, it is present in 98%. It is absent in the 
other cases. 
• Dangerous phenomena (pressure effects, missile ejection): If the event “silo destruction” has 
occurred, it is only pressure effects in 2%, only missile ejection in 3%, and a combination of 
pressure effects and missile ejection in 95%. It is absent in the other cases. 
• Safety impact: If the Dangerous phenomenon is a pressure effect, then this impact is present in 
70%; if the Dangerous phenomenon is a missile ejection, it is present in 80%; if the Dangerous 
phenomenon is a combination of pressure effects and missile ejection, it is present in 99.99%. It 
is absent in the other cases. 
 
4.4. Simulations and diagnoses 
On the basis of the quantified risk model, different configurations can be studied with the following 
hypothesis: it is considered that the nitrogen sensor and the shielding braids are present in the system, 
i.e. the decision variables “Nitrogen_sensor_installation” and “Shielding_braid_installation” (in Figure 
11) are settled at “Present”. 
 
The first studied configuration concerns the a priori results for “Sensor calibration effectiveness” 
(93.7%), “Shielding braid supervision effectiveness” (97%), “Operational availability of 5% oxygen 
detection barrier” (94.3%), “Operational availability of 7% oxygen detection barrier” (93.4%), 
“Operational availability of shielding braid barrier” (99.8%) and “Safety impact” (99.9%). These data 
are in coherence with those used to build the model. These results globally qualify the model in a 
favourable situation, i.e. with no pathogenic organisational factors. 
 
The second configuration is obtained by using conclusions issued from on-site investigations to make 
simulations. Thus the presence of the pathogenic organisational factors “SOCS”, “PP” and “NRDH” 
(cf. Table 13) are considered. These cases stress that: 
- If availabilities of barriers are considered, both “production pressures” (for shielding braids) and 
“no re-examining of the design hypotheses” (for oxygen detection barriers) have to be handled in 
priority. This configuration is due to the fact that operators in charge of the calibration action are 
dedicated to this activity (maintenance staff), but the operators in charge of the supervision action 
have to accumulate this action with other ones (production staff). 







 SOCS PP NRDH SOCS+PP+NRDH 
Sensor calibration effectiveness 81.7 81.5 66.5 51.1 
OA of 5% oxygen detection barrier 88.5 88.3 81 73.5 
OA of 7% oxygen detection barrier 87.7 87.5 80.3 72.8 
Braid supervision effectiveness 97 76.3 93 74.2 
OA of shielding braid barrier 99.8 98.8 99.6 98.6 
Presence of safety impacts 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.11 
Table 13: Influences of the organisational situation on specific parts of the system 
 
The third configuration is obtained by considering safety impacts as being “Present” to make a 
diagnosis and then to identify most influent variables. These variables are the following ones: “OA of 
7% oxygen detection barrier” (0%), “OA of filter barrier” (0%), “OA of 5% oxygen detection barrier” 
(0.01%), “assembly/re-assembly errors” (25.4%), “presence of internal hot spots” (81.1%) and “OA of 
shielding braids” (95.8%).  
It implies to study more specifically these different components. In that way, a first study can be 
achieved to identify major contributors of the unavailability of oxygen detection barriers, and more 
particularly on those related to the ineffectiveness of the sensor calibration. The results of this 
diagnosis situation, focused on the ineffectiveness of the sensor calibration, are presented in Table 14. 
In this case, it is required to pay attention in priority to the execution stage (E), the collective 
management and group dynamic (Cmgd), and the no re-examining of the design hypotheses (NRDH). 
 





58.5  Action indicators 
Rtc Damaged 3 De 2.8 




  NRDH 
Present 





18.6  DIFE 3.3 
Fe 13.1  PP 2.9 
Ai 8.5  SOCS 2.9 
Ex 8.3  FDSM 2.2 
Cf 7.7  WCB 1.9 
Rws 6.3  PHOC 1 Tr 3.4  
Table 14: Contributors of the sensor calibration ineffectiveness  
 
4.5. Sensitivity analysis 
The results obtained with the proposed model need to be validated in order to conclude on the 
relevance and quality of the model. In that way, a first step within validity procedure (first static step) 
is implemented with the methodology development because the model structure and its building are 
issued from systemic principles and experts’ knowledge. It means that the modeling mechanisms are 
not only syntaxic but also semantic. 
Moreover, the validation study concerns also the model variables and parameters, and can be achieved 
through a sensitivity analysis as proposed in [59]. Indeed in [59], it is shown a methodology for 
Knowledge Engineering of Bayesian Networks in which the sensitivity analysis is used to “measure 
the sensitivity of changes in probabilities of query nodes when parameters and inputs are changed”. 
Concerning the industrial application selected here, the focus is on sensitivity to findings which 
considers “how the Bayesian Network’s posterior distributions change under different conditions”. A 
part of this analysis is depicted in Figure 12 (the endpoint node considered is the sensor calibration 
effectiveness). 
In the Figure 12, nodes are listed from the least influential to the most influential. Horizontal bars 
highlight the variations of the sensor calibration effectiveness when the probability of its direct and 
indirect parent nodes is varied from 0 to 100%.      
This analysis confirms observations presented in Table 14 for the most important contributors of the 
action ineffectiveness, and for the overall classification of action stages and pathogenic organisational 
factors, but for items the prioritisation is slightly different. 
Indeed, variables identified as being highly sensitive to change (the most critical ones) are for each 
system dimension: the Execution action stage, the item ‘Cmgd’, and the organisational factor 
‘NRDH’.    
Concerning the overall classification, different items have to be underlined: 
- The ineffectiveness of the sensor calibration can be explained by a combination of its direct and 
indirect parents (action stages, items, and organisational factors).  
- The prioritisation of action stages and organisational factors are similar in Table 14 and Figure 12.  
These points confirm that the proposed BN accurately model the prior domain knowledge. 
The difference observed in the classification of items is due to the important number of correlations, 
which make these variables more sensitive to changes. It highlights the needs of further developments 
concerning sensitivity analyses problems in order to eventually propose a dedicated method (based on 
behaviour analyses, mathematical approaches and/or experts’ judgments) for the analysis of the 
formalised model. 
 
4.6. Conclusions on the application and its modelling 
The application step leads to the following comments: 
- The organisational factors “PP” and “NRDH” have to be handled in priority. “SOCS” should be 
studied thereafter. 
- About the sensor calibration, it is required to pay attention in priority to its execution stage and its 
collective coordination. 
- A detailed study has to be conducted on filter barrier to identify human and organisational major 
contributors of its unavailability. 
- Specific studies must be done on initiators for assembly or re-assembly errors. 
 
More generally, the proposed risk model enables to identify, in one analysis, major contributors 
(initiators, safety barriers, human and organisational weaknesses) for a specific target (e.g. the safety 
impact in section 4), and to be able to offer a complete set of solutions. In other words, it allows: 
- To demonstrate that direct causes of an accident occurrence can be explained by other ones 
(indirect), and that their treatment have to be addressed collectively (i.e. by considering the whole 
causes and not only parts of them). 
- An ordering of technical and human events considering their criticality for the system safety, and 
then to make a choice for the events that have to be detailed. 
These characteristics can help decision makers to anticipate critical situations and to prioritise their 
investments (economical, human, technical …).  
 
Conclusion 
The methodology presented in this paper allows a handling of a socio-technical system risk analysis in 
an integrated way. The integration is done step by step, due to the complexity degree of considered 
systems. The first one consists in identifying the system limits, allowing in a second step, to define 
adapted methods relative to knowledge collection of each system dimension (technical, human and 
organisational). The method choice can be done only after a theoretical study because the way of 
analysing, representing and quantifying all the considered dimensions can be really different. The third 
item is about the proposition of methods that handle the unification issue in order to integrate these 
different dimensions in a same risk model. This proposal cannot be uncorrelated of the selected 
modelling tool which is the Bayesian Networks in this methodology (owing to its characteristics: it 
deals with probabilistic and deterministic data, correlated variables, uncertainties ...). Then, it becomes 
possible to develop, in a generic way, models and associated quantification methods. The generic 
characteristics cover different activity sectors but require knowledge on the proposed methodology 
mechanisms and underlying concepts to be in a position to apply it on a particular case. 
Finally, the application on a specific industrial system demonstrates the methodology feasibility and 
validity. Indeed, observations of recurrent behaviours stress the robustness of the obtained results. 
Moreover, these results are in coherence with observations made on the field.  
The thus-built model highlights major contributors by means of simulations and diagnoses, of a safety 
problem. It enables to propose solutions and/or further studies for these specific system elements 
(technical components, human actions, organisational factors). This tool can thus be useful for 
decision makers to anticipate critical situations, and to conclude on strategies and investments 
prioritisation. 
Nevertheless the methodology requires times and resources to collect data and to build the associated 
model. It leads to consider its efficient development only for critical systems (nuclear power plants, 
chemical processes ...). 
Currently, the proposed approach has several limitations needing further developments. These 
developments concern mainly the automation of the model building, the modelling of resilient 
characteristics of studied systems, and the consideration of model and measure uncertainties. 
Some other items have to be thoroughly investigated in order to complete the proposed approach, 
which are namely: the definition of influence and quantification classes according to specific studied 
actions and components; the definition of influence and quantification classes according to specific 
organisational structures, actions and processes; the consideration of human and organisational 
impacts not only through safety barriers but also as bow-tie initiators or events; the development of 
methods that allow a generalisation of semi-quantitative scales used in such analyses; the development 
of methods for model validations (such as sensitivity analyses); and the application of the proposed 
methodology to other industrial cases in order to identify possible adaptations and simplifications 
(according to the activity for example) and to build a dedicated feedback experience. 
Concerning the last point, EDF currently applies the methodology on several specific cases (for the 
analysis of nuclear systems and hydraulic ones).   
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